Controlling Russian Weapons of Mass Destruction: 21st Century Solutions to a 20th Century Problem

By Andrew Rohrbach
Virginia, USA

For over fifty years, the focal point of American foreign policy was our relationship with the Soviet Union. United States actions in most key areas centered on countering the Soviets. Priorities have changed dramatically as a result of the fall of the iron curtain and the events of September 11th. The attention of the American Foreign Service has shifted to fighting terrorism, and the Middle East has received increased attention. However, America continues to have a major interest in an issue left over from the Cold War-era: the control of weapons of mass destruction. Russia and the former Soviet states have tens of thousands of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that are often unprotected, insufficiently maintained, or poorly secured. Indeed, a mere 38% of Russian nuclear material had been protected by 2003, according to a recent report from the General Accounting Office. In order for the United States to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists, we must continue our efforts to safeguard or destroy these weapons.

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the State Department played a major role in the development of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat-Reduction (CTR) program, a federal program credited with the destruction or securing of over 6,000 Russian nuclear warheads ("Conversion of Soviet Weapons"). Since then, the American Foreign Service has continued to have a critical role in this endeavor. The challenge of securing Russian weapons of mass destruction requires a joint effort by both nations. For example, the State Department has worked with the governments of the former Soviet States as part of its Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program to write and implement new, wide-ranging export laws and provide cooperation and support for enforcement of the laws already in existence ("EXBS Program"). Other examples of CTR efforts include those in the 1990s by the State Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to facilitate cooperation between the Department of Energy and the Russian Kurachatov Institute to research the feasibility of converting Russian plutonium reactors into solely-power generation plants, and to establish a website jointly with the Russian Center on Export Controls for Russia's military-industrial complex regarding, among other things, customs laws and the export procedure regarding dual-use materials ("Internet Site for Exporters").

In addition, the American Foreign Service has tried to gain information from the governments of Russia and the other former Soviet republics that possessed weapons of mass destruction, and to develop programs based on that information. The Foreign Service convinced the G-8 nations to help fund and support CTR (Moltz). The State Department has worked with Congress to increase funding of the CTR programs, succeeding recently with President Bush's authorization of $150 million to build a facility for destroying chemical weapons in Russia (Eisler).

Another important facet of the problem involves the ex-Soviet weapons scientists, many of whom are unemployed. The Foreign Service has worked with the Russian government to develop programs to retrain these researchers (Joffe). One example is the venture between Numotech, an American medical firm, and Spektr-Conversion, a Russian company, to employ Russian ex-scientists to make medical supplies ("Joint Russian-US Nuclear Cities"). The State Department also coordinates American involvement in the International Science & Technology Center (ISTC), an international organization that solicits grant proposals from Russian WMD scientists. The ISTC provides the scientists with market-competitive salaries to work on non-WMD related projects like the environment or fusion reactors, rather than on nuclear programs of other nations (Russia: ISTC). Congress has also authorized the State Department to receive funding for the support and coordination of other similar programs for these scientists, such as the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STUC) and the Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists Program (Congressional Research Service).

The work of the American Foreign Service is not complete. A recent GAO report on the subject was subtitled "Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites" (General Accounting Office). In this report, Russia is estimated to have 600 metric tons of nuclear material, but the United States is being slowed by a lack of access to the sites (Ibid). Negotiations by the State Department in conjunction with the Department of Energy are vital for securing this access. A 2003 report by a group of think tanks agrees with the conclusions of the GAO, saying that "Building a better international relationship with Russia would help reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and its erstwhile republics…" ("Plan for Dealing with Soviet Weapons") It is only through the ongoing work of the American Foreign Service to foster cooperative relationships with Russia and other nations that the goal of securing weapons of mass destruction and preventing them from falling into the hands of terrorists can be achieved.

Works Cited

1. Congressional Research Service. Federation of American Scientists. Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to Former Soviet States. 10 April 2002. 29 February 2004

2. Conversion of Soviet Weapons of Mass Destruction. 19 Dec. 2003 . Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat-Reduction Program. 26 January 2004.

3. "Core Converstion: Nuclear Reactors." Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. 13 Sept. 1995. U.S. Department of State. 29 February 2004

4. General Accounting Office. Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. 24 March 2003. 26 January 2004

5. Eisler, Peter. "Bush frees cash to secure Soviet arms U.S. wants to stop foes from getting weapons." USA Today 14 January 2003. Johnson's Russia List, Center for Defense Information. 16 January 2004

6. "EXBS Program: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance, The."U.S. Department of State. 2003. United States Department of State. 29 February 2004

7. "Internet Site for Exporters." Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. 05 March 1997. U.S. Department of State. 29 February 2004

8. Joffe, A.H. "Environmental Security and the Consequences of WMD Production: An Emerging International Issue" Disarmament Diplomacy 54 (Feb. 2001). 26 January 2004

9. "Joint U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cities Venture Launched." Arms Control Today 33. 10 (Dec. 2003). 26 January 2004

10. Moltz, James Clay. "Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Europe and on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives." 14 May 2003. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 26 January 2004

11. "Plan for dealing with Soviet weapons legacy announced." CNN. 20 January 2003. 26 January 2004

12. Russia: International Science & Technology Center (ISTC). 2003. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 29 Feb.2004