School: Davidson IB Middle School
City: Mamohatra
Team: Luke Frederick Churchill, Emily Annie Yue, Rebekah Ruth Swallow
Teacher: Jay Durant Hager
Engineer-Mentor: Dane Allen Horna, PE
Mamohatra
Mamohatra has combined futuristic technologies, green principles, and cultural diversity to create a thriving, sustainable metropolis on the island of Madagascar. Our citizens enjoy clean water, renewable energy, convenient and efficient public transportation, job opportunities, arts and entertainment, and beautiful parks and recreation.
Implementing environmentally friendly technologies, we have developed CARE (Community Adaptable Refugee Establishment), a system designed to combat the global problems of poverty and homelessness. CARE meets the needs of refugees and the homeless by providing secure temporary homes with flexible living spaces and convenient access to all city services, including educational programs and job training. The CARE system also provides electricity, clean water, public transportation, communications, and waste management. We apply the principles of green engineering, using industrial processes that are economically feasible and have a low carbon footprint. These processes make CARE a clean, green, transitional living facility.
The CARE system is targeted toward refugees, homeless, and poor (people who earn 50% or less of average income). The complex can house 10-15,000 people. The CARE system is designed to help its residents by providing public services geared toward the immediate needs of the residents, such as job training and language acquisition. The CARE system is set up to help residents make the transition from temporary accommodations to paid employment and permanent housing. Community colleges and small starter loans help encourage people to improve their lives. Nestled between the industrial, commercial, and agricultural districts, and near transportation hubs, CARE provides residents convenient access to our entire city, making it easier for them to find jobs suited to their skills and then to rent or purchase their own housing in other parts of the city.
CARE structures are adobe-like, multistory complexes, made of a compound called “agro-waste” and bio-based foam insulation, and built vertically to save land. Once a prototype, agro-waste has become a reality. It is made by mixing various agricultural wastes such as rice and cornhusks, and then adding beach sand to make a moldable paste. When it hardens, the paste creates a reusable compound similar to stucco in both color and texture. It is highly durable against violent weather and other types of damage. When agro-waste’s minimal insulation is coupled with bio-based foam insulation, it provides a shield against extreme temperatures and helps prevent the spread of disease. Agro-waste transforms agricultural waste into an environmentally sustainable building material that decreases the carbon footprint.
CARE units are assembled with a lightweight durable carbon fiber frame on which the agro-waste is attached. The frame has nanosensors that analyze the integrity of the agro-waste material for safety. The nanosensors replace the more expensive nanobots located in buildings in other parts of our city, thus providing a more economical maintenance system.
Inside the buildings, sliding “smart screens,” similar to those in Japan, allow each unit to be adapted to the needs of different size families, which might range from one to eight persons. Smart screens allow residents to change the layout of walls, as well as their color, style, and decorative themes. The screens also reflect light waves, creating an aesthetically pleasing glow.
Our building is not only durable, but also replaceable. When the structure is in need of replacement (approximately 100 years), the agro-waste is re-compounded with new agricultural waste to reform the structure onto the existing frame. Sensors built into the carbon fiber frame send waves throughout the entire structure assessing cracks, breaks, and other flaws in the structure. This system records the flaws and when the flaws become too large or hazardous, engineers come to fix them. Using this system, the structures may endure for centuries.
CARE incorporates numerous green technologies to maximize efficiency. Our engineers researched multiple technologies and decided on Earthship design. Earthship design is the process of designing a home using the most efficient materials and technologies. Our engineers matched CARE to some of the more effective processes used in Earthships: “green” roofs and walls, and passive cooling. With different plants growing on the structure itself, green roofs provide food, recreation, and climate control. Passive cooling is a biomimicry concept—a building technology that mimics processes found in nature. Passive cooling mimics a termite nest, which is built to take advantage of natural solar heating and cooling from breezes. Like a termite mound, our building uses an intricate network of walls and windows to funnel air throughout the structure. It collects cool air that moves down and hot air that moves up. This regulates the temperature by controlling the amount of hot and cool air that flows through the building.
Although CARE is a very efficiently engineered community, it is not without faults. Agro-waste does not produce much extra refuse, but to dispose of any waste we use plasma gasification, a trash-disposal system that uses high temperatures to turn waste into a gas that can be made into textiles. Our plasma gasification system takes away almost all of the negative impact that the CARE system has on the environment.
CARE not only provides for the needs of thousands of refugees, it also enriches the entire community of our city. The quality of life and accommodations provided by CARE increases both land value and the overall appeal of our city. CARE promotes international cooperation and allows for everyone to find a place in Mamohatra. It provides public services and jobs for citizens that have nowhere else to go and minimizes crime by keeping the homeless off the streets. CARE’s technologies and systems provide a model for buildings everywhere. Soon, the CARE system will extend across the globe, leading to a tomorrow where the word ‘homeless’ is obsolete.
20100501
20100428
Responding to Crimes against Humanity: Prevention, Deployment, and Localization
Sophia Sanchez
Ladue Horton Watkins High School
St. Louis, Missouri
Coordinator: Megan McCorkle
“Never again” has long been the somber declaration of those victimized by crimes against humanity. It bears with it the hope that the international community can learn from past atrocities and, in the words of the United Nations Charter, “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”1 However, a lack of cohesive international action has meant that genocide, torture, and other such acts continue to occur. Based on lessons learned from case studies of Somalia and Rwanda, the international community should prevent escalation of conflict by addressing its socioeconomic root causes, maintain a long-term peacekeeping force that utilizes a multilateral approach, and establish a localized administration system bolstered by a structure of accountability.
The Somali conflict stemmed from decades of political and ethnic unrest, which was intensified by the regime of Siad Barre. The northern Issaq clan resented Siad Barre’s 1969 seizure of power, which established an ethnically Marehan government.2 In 1988, the Somali National Movement (SNM), a primarily northern endeavor, began an insurrection against the Barre regime.3 On January 27, 1991, Siad Barre fled the capital to escape the northern assault, causing a power struggle between the former United Somali Congress members.4
By the end of 1992, over 300,000 Somalis had died from the conflict.5 Human Rights Watch expressed its outrage at seeing Somali refugees “undergoing traumatic suffering with apparently no end in sight.”6 The United Nations later labeled the systematic rape, displacement, and torture by rival clans in Somalia as crimes against humanity as defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.7
While rhetoric was in no short supply among global actors, the humanitarian response to the crisis proved inadequate. Relief efforts were complicated by the loss of 60 percent of Somalia’s infrastructure and insufficient peacekeeping forces.8 From October to December of 1992, the World Food Programme anticipated sending 100,000 metric tons of food to Somalia, but only distributed 18,900 metric tons.9 UNOSOM (United Nations Operations in Somalia) concentrated its forces in Mogadishu while leaving positions in smaller settlements unfilled, effectively cutting off assistance to certain regions of Somalia.10
As the atrocities mounted, international actors began to withdraw altogether from Somalia. On October 3 and 4, 1993, eighteen American soldiers were killed during the Battle of Mogadishu.11 Faction leader Mohammad Aideed used these deaths to increase foreign discontent with the Somali operations and rid the country of peacekeeping forces.12 By March 31, 1994, all United States forces had evacuated Somalia.13 Lacking support, UNOSOM disbanded one year later, and Somalia became the epitome of a failed state and a failed international intervention.14
The violence in Rwanda resulted from prolonged ethnic tension that erupted after the assassination of Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana. After Hutus overthrew the Tutsi king in 1959, displaced Tutsis formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda.15 The RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990, marking the beginning of the civil war.16 Radio stations broadcast propaganda, urging Hutus to “exterminate the Tutsi cockroaches.”17 On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, an act the Hutus blamed on the Tutsis, and three months of genocide began.18
From April 6 to July 4, 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandans were systematically murdered.19 Two million Rwandans fled to neighboring countries, where many ended up in disease-ridden refugee camps.20 On May 17, 1994, a UN Security Council resolution stated that “acts of genocide may have been committed,” but refrained from definitively labeling the Rwandan conflict “genocide.”21 As Vince Kern, director for African affairs and head of the Rwanda Task Force at the Pentagon, explained, “Genocide finding could commit [governments] to actually ‘do something.’ ”22 The genocide ended on July 4, 1994, when the RPF captured the capital city of Kigali, but Rwanda was left in ruins.23
Despite the international community’s knowledge of these atrocities, its response to the conflict in Rwanda proved woefully insufficient. A CIA report issued 20 days before Habyarimana’s assassination stated that 300,000 to 500,000 people could be killed if hostilities intensified.24 Clearly, the international community knew of the danger, but lacked a plan of action. Matters worsened when Hutu extremists murdered ten Belgians on April 7, 1994, prompting an international outcry.25 The United States closed its embassy, while the United Nations withdrew all but 270 UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) peacekeeping troops for the duration of the genocide.26
After the conflict ended, the international community implemented a tiered judicial system that worked toward lasting peace. An international tribunal presided over high-profile cases, while the localized Gacaca court system handled less serious offenders.27 The courts held trials in each village to not only prosecute defendants accused of genocide, but also to promote reconciliation through dialogue and community service.28 Such localized reintegration programs may be the key to quelling ethnic tension. For example, after the Gacaca system was implemented in Sovu, Rwanda, only 2 percent of residents agreed with the statement “I prefer to buy things from a shopkeeper of my own ethnicity.”29 The Gacaca approach was one of the successes of the Rwandan intervention, although much work remains to be done.
With the atrocities committed in Somalia and Rwanda in mind, international actors should subdue conflict by addressing socioeconomic root causes. On a financial level, the international community should work to stabilize depressed economies in at-risk nations. One way this might be achieved is through microfinancing, a small-scale investment program that effectively stimulated post-war Rwandan farming.30 The international community should also address social tensions by targeting hate radio, which was a large factor in escalating ethnic resentment in both Somalia and Rwanda.31 International law should permit the destruction of hate-radio transmitters when an agreed-upon code of conduct is broken.32 The global community must address economic and social root causes of conflict if it hopes to effectively prevent mass atrocities from occurring.
On the national level, governments such as the United States should establish an interagency Atrocities Prevention Committee (APC), as outlined by the Genocide Prevention Task Force.33 The APC should work with the United Nations, subregional organizations, NGOs, and individual nations to coordinate information concerning at-risk nations. The committee should establish a tiered warning system, based on factors such as institutional racism, history of conflict, media propaganda, and leadership instability. Reports such as the one that predicted 300,000 to 500,000 deaths in Rwanda should immediately trigger an ad hoc meeting at the presidential level to discuss policy options. With mass atrocities like the Rwandan genocide occurring in the time span of 100 days, it is imperative that international actors be prepared to take quick and decisive action to prevent their occurrence.
Should the conflict reach a point where preventive measures are no longer possible, international peacekeeping forces should commit themselves to rapid deployment and long-term stationing. The United Nations should plan for troop deployment in at-risk nations within 30 days of a Security Council resolution.34 In order to supply sufficient peacekeeping forces, international organizations should capitalize on subregional offers of assistance and support a civilian police force within war-torn countries. The key is to create a multilateral coalition that reflects global sentiments, not to establish western imperialism. These measures can work to drastically decrease response time and increase long-term peacekeeping capabilities by involving troops at the international, regional, and national levels.
Finally, the United Nations, United States, and other international actors should rely on a decentralized peacekeeping approach, rather than focusing on an urban headquarters. In order to increase dissemination of aid, staffing small towns should be a greater priority than establishing a headquarters in the capital.35 Global actors can garner local support by admitting regional leaders into intervention discussions. In northern Somalia, UNOSOM incorporated local elders into policy meetings, which increased clan willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in dismantling anarchistic factions.36 Placing a priority on local intervention personnel leads to better distribution of aid and more effective peace negotiations.
The judicial system for crimes against humanity should likewise be localized. The system should be modeled on the Rwandan Gacacas, assigning a court to each village. As more criminals are brought to justice, localized court systems demonstrate that war crimes will be punished. Dialogue between the accused and the victimized and a sentence involving community service should be key facets of the courts. A system of accountability similar to the one in Rwanda, in which 90 percent of the electorate voted for Gacaca judges, would ensure that local judges have the consent of the people and are not arbitrarily appointed.37 Moreover, the international community should establish sentencing guidelines, which would standardize punishments and guarantee a focus on reintegration, not retribution. By utilizing a localized judicial system, the international community can transition from a goal of short-term peace to long-term stability.
In the wake of the atrocities in Somalia and Rwanda, it is critical that the international community learn to better protect against crimes against humanity. By addressing the root causes of conflict, rapidly deploying a long-term peacekeeping force, and shifting to a localized administration approach, international actors can convert rhetoric into results. The process will not happen overnight, but by implementing these policies, the international community can begin to make “never again” a reality.
Notes
1. Goodrich, Leland Matthew, and Edvard Isak Hambro. Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. London: World Peace Foundation, 1949.
2. Sahnoun, Mohamed. Somalia: The Missed Opportunities. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994.
3. Brown, Michael E., and Richard N. Rosecrance. The Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.
4. Sahnoun. Somalia.
5. Bush, George. “Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia.” Lettter from President Bush to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Washington, DC, December 10, 1992.
6. "Human Rights Watch World Report 1993—Somalia." Human Rights Watch. January 1, 1993. Accessed January 20, 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca601e.html
7. Rishmawi, Mona. "Situation of Human Rights in Somalia." UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva. April 22, 1999.
8. "Somalia—UNOSOM I." United Nations Operations in Somalia I . March 21, 1997. Accessed 23 January 2009. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm
9. Sahnoun. Somalia.10. Ibid.
11. Smith, Michael. Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team. New York: St. Martin's, 2007.
12. Kaempf, Sebastian. “Somalia and General Aideed's Strategic Response to U.S. Intervention: Invoking America's Experiences in Lebanon and Vietnam.” Paper presented at the nnual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 2007.
13. Copson, Raymond W. Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.
14. Peterson, Scott. Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda. New York: Routledge, 2000.
15. Cohen, Jared. One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
16. Ibid.
17. Sutton, Barbara, Sandra Morgen, and Julie Novkov. Security Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race, and Militarization. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008.
18. Khan, Shaharyar M., and Mary Robinson. The Shallow Graves of Rwanda. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000.
19. Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.
20. "Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide." Special Report, January 1995. United States Institute of Peace. Accessed January 20, 2009.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwanda1.html
21. "Timeline: 100 Days of Genocide." BBC News, April 6, 2004. AccessedJanuary 21, 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3580247.stm
22. Kern, Vince. Discussion paper. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 18, 1998.
23. Cohen, Jared. One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,2007.
24. Ibid.
25. Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
26. Ibid.
27. Drumbl, Mark A. Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
28. Ibid.
29. Rettig, Max. "Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?" African Studies Review 51 (2008): 25¬–50.
30. Wilson, Tamsin. "Microfinance during and after Armed Conflict: Lessons from Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Rwanda.” Concern Worldwide and the Springfield Centre for Business in Development. March 2002. AccessedJanuary 22 2009. http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/14563_14563.pdf
31. Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000.
32. As suggested in Allan Thompson and Kofi Annan. The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007.
33. Albright, Madeleine K., and William S. Cohen, co-chairs. Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. Genocide Prevention Task Force. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, American Academy of Diplomacy, and United States Institute of Peace. 2008. Accessed January 21, 2009. http://www.usip.org/genocide_taskforce/pdf/FINAL%20REPORT.pdf
34. As suggested in Lakhdar Brahimi, chairman. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. New York: United Nations, 2000.
35. Sahnoun. Somalia.
36. Ibid.
37. Brown, Jane. "Rwanda—Gacaca." Center for Communication Programs, John Hopkins University. 2005. Accessed January 19, 2009.
http://www.jhuccp.org/africa/rwanda/gacaca.shtml
Bibliography
Print Sources
Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000.
Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
Brahimi, Lakhdar, chairman. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. New York: United Nations, 2000.
Brown, Michael E., and Richard N. Rosecrance. The Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield , 1999.
Bush, George. “Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia.” Lettter from President Bush to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Washington, DC, December 10, 1992.
Cohen, Jared. One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
Copson, Raymond W. Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.
Drumbl, Mark A. Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Goodrich, Leland Matthew, and Edvard Isak Hambro. Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. London: World Peace Foundation, 1949.
Kaempf, Sebastian. “Somalia and General Aideed's Strategic Response to U.S. Intervention: Invoking Americas Experiences in Lebanon and Vietnam.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. Chicago, IL, 2007.
Kern, Vince. Discussion paper. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 18, 1998.
Khan, Shaharyar M., and Mary Robinson. The Shallow Graves of Rwanda. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000.
Peterson, Scott. Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Rettig, Max. "Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?" African Studies Review 51 (2008): 25–50.
Rishmawi, Mona. "Situation of Human Rights in Somalia." UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva. April 22, 1999.
Sahnoun, Mohamed. Somalia: The Missed Opportunities. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994.
Smith, Michael. Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team. New York: St. Martin's, 2007.
Sutton, Barbara, Sandra Morgen, and Julie Novkov. Security Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race, and Militarization.
Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008.
Thompson, Allan, and Kofi Annan. The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007.
Internet Sources
Albright, Madeleine K., and William S. Cohen, co-chairs. Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. Genocide Prevention Task Force. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, American Academy of Diplomacy, and United States Institute of Peace. 2008. Accessed January 21, 2009. http://www.usip.org/genocide_taskforce/pdf/FINAL%20REPORT.pdf
Brown, Jane. "Rwanda—Gacaca." Center for Communication Programs, John Hopkins University. 2005. Accessed January 19, 2009. http://www.jhuccp.org/africa/rwanda/gacaca.shtml
"Human Rights Watch World Report 1993—Somalia." January 1, 1993. Human Rights Watch. Accessed January 20, 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca601e.html
"Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide." Special Report, January 1995. United States Institute of Peace. Accessed January 20, 2009. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwanda1.html
"Somalia—UNOSOM I." United Nations Operations in Somalia I. March 21, 1997. Accessed January 23, 2009. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm
"Timeline: 100 Days of Genocide," BBC News, April 6, 2004. Accessed January 21, 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3580247.stm
Wilson, Tamsin. "Microfinance during and after Armed Conflict: Lessons from Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda.” Concern Worldwide and the Springfield Centre for Business in Development. March 2002. Accessed January 22, 2009. http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/14563_14563.pdf
Ladue Horton Watkins High School
St. Louis, Missouri
Coordinator: Megan McCorkle
“Never again” has long been the somber declaration of those victimized by crimes against humanity. It bears with it the hope that the international community can learn from past atrocities and, in the words of the United Nations Charter, “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”1 However, a lack of cohesive international action has meant that genocide, torture, and other such acts continue to occur. Based on lessons learned from case studies of Somalia and Rwanda, the international community should prevent escalation of conflict by addressing its socioeconomic root causes, maintain a long-term peacekeeping force that utilizes a multilateral approach, and establish a localized administration system bolstered by a structure of accountability.
The Somali conflict stemmed from decades of political and ethnic unrest, which was intensified by the regime of Siad Barre. The northern Issaq clan resented Siad Barre’s 1969 seizure of power, which established an ethnically Marehan government.2 In 1988, the Somali National Movement (SNM), a primarily northern endeavor, began an insurrection against the Barre regime.3 On January 27, 1991, Siad Barre fled the capital to escape the northern assault, causing a power struggle between the former United Somali Congress members.4
By the end of 1992, over 300,000 Somalis had died from the conflict.5 Human Rights Watch expressed its outrage at seeing Somali refugees “undergoing traumatic suffering with apparently no end in sight.”6 The United Nations later labeled the systematic rape, displacement, and torture by rival clans in Somalia as crimes against humanity as defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.7
While rhetoric was in no short supply among global actors, the humanitarian response to the crisis proved inadequate. Relief efforts were complicated by the loss of 60 percent of Somalia’s infrastructure and insufficient peacekeeping forces.8 From October to December of 1992, the World Food Programme anticipated sending 100,000 metric tons of food to Somalia, but only distributed 18,900 metric tons.9 UNOSOM (United Nations Operations in Somalia) concentrated its forces in Mogadishu while leaving positions in smaller settlements unfilled, effectively cutting off assistance to certain regions of Somalia.10
As the atrocities mounted, international actors began to withdraw altogether from Somalia. On October 3 and 4, 1993, eighteen American soldiers were killed during the Battle of Mogadishu.11 Faction leader Mohammad Aideed used these deaths to increase foreign discontent with the Somali operations and rid the country of peacekeeping forces.12 By March 31, 1994, all United States forces had evacuated Somalia.13 Lacking support, UNOSOM disbanded one year later, and Somalia became the epitome of a failed state and a failed international intervention.14
The violence in Rwanda resulted from prolonged ethnic tension that erupted after the assassination of Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana. After Hutus overthrew the Tutsi king in 1959, displaced Tutsis formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in Uganda.15 The RPF invaded Rwanda in 1990, marking the beginning of the civil war.16 Radio stations broadcast propaganda, urging Hutus to “exterminate the Tutsi cockroaches.”17 On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, an act the Hutus blamed on the Tutsis, and three months of genocide began.18
From April 6 to July 4, 1994, approximately 800,000 Rwandans were systematically murdered.19 Two million Rwandans fled to neighboring countries, where many ended up in disease-ridden refugee camps.20 On May 17, 1994, a UN Security Council resolution stated that “acts of genocide may have been committed,” but refrained from definitively labeling the Rwandan conflict “genocide.”21 As Vince Kern, director for African affairs and head of the Rwanda Task Force at the Pentagon, explained, “Genocide finding could commit [governments] to actually ‘do something.’ ”22 The genocide ended on July 4, 1994, when the RPF captured the capital city of Kigali, but Rwanda was left in ruins.23
Despite the international community’s knowledge of these atrocities, its response to the conflict in Rwanda proved woefully insufficient. A CIA report issued 20 days before Habyarimana’s assassination stated that 300,000 to 500,000 people could be killed if hostilities intensified.24 Clearly, the international community knew of the danger, but lacked a plan of action. Matters worsened when Hutu extremists murdered ten Belgians on April 7, 1994, prompting an international outcry.25 The United States closed its embassy, while the United Nations withdrew all but 270 UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) peacekeeping troops for the duration of the genocide.26
After the conflict ended, the international community implemented a tiered judicial system that worked toward lasting peace. An international tribunal presided over high-profile cases, while the localized Gacaca court system handled less serious offenders.27 The courts held trials in each village to not only prosecute defendants accused of genocide, but also to promote reconciliation through dialogue and community service.28 Such localized reintegration programs may be the key to quelling ethnic tension. For example, after the Gacaca system was implemented in Sovu, Rwanda, only 2 percent of residents agreed with the statement “I prefer to buy things from a shopkeeper of my own ethnicity.”29 The Gacaca approach was one of the successes of the Rwandan intervention, although much work remains to be done.
With the atrocities committed in Somalia and Rwanda in mind, international actors should subdue conflict by addressing socioeconomic root causes. On a financial level, the international community should work to stabilize depressed economies in at-risk nations. One way this might be achieved is through microfinancing, a small-scale investment program that effectively stimulated post-war Rwandan farming.30 The international community should also address social tensions by targeting hate radio, which was a large factor in escalating ethnic resentment in both Somalia and Rwanda.31 International law should permit the destruction of hate-radio transmitters when an agreed-upon code of conduct is broken.32 The global community must address economic and social root causes of conflict if it hopes to effectively prevent mass atrocities from occurring.
On the national level, governments such as the United States should establish an interagency Atrocities Prevention Committee (APC), as outlined by the Genocide Prevention Task Force.33 The APC should work with the United Nations, subregional organizations, NGOs, and individual nations to coordinate information concerning at-risk nations. The committee should establish a tiered warning system, based on factors such as institutional racism, history of conflict, media propaganda, and leadership instability. Reports such as the one that predicted 300,000 to 500,000 deaths in Rwanda should immediately trigger an ad hoc meeting at the presidential level to discuss policy options. With mass atrocities like the Rwandan genocide occurring in the time span of 100 days, it is imperative that international actors be prepared to take quick and decisive action to prevent their occurrence.
Should the conflict reach a point where preventive measures are no longer possible, international peacekeeping forces should commit themselves to rapid deployment and long-term stationing. The United Nations should plan for troop deployment in at-risk nations within 30 days of a Security Council resolution.34 In order to supply sufficient peacekeeping forces, international organizations should capitalize on subregional offers of assistance and support a civilian police force within war-torn countries. The key is to create a multilateral coalition that reflects global sentiments, not to establish western imperialism. These measures can work to drastically decrease response time and increase long-term peacekeeping capabilities by involving troops at the international, regional, and national levels.
Finally, the United Nations, United States, and other international actors should rely on a decentralized peacekeeping approach, rather than focusing on an urban headquarters. In order to increase dissemination of aid, staffing small towns should be a greater priority than establishing a headquarters in the capital.35 Global actors can garner local support by admitting regional leaders into intervention discussions. In northern Somalia, UNOSOM incorporated local elders into policy meetings, which increased clan willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in dismantling anarchistic factions.36 Placing a priority on local intervention personnel leads to better distribution of aid and more effective peace negotiations.
The judicial system for crimes against humanity should likewise be localized. The system should be modeled on the Rwandan Gacacas, assigning a court to each village. As more criminals are brought to justice, localized court systems demonstrate that war crimes will be punished. Dialogue between the accused and the victimized and a sentence involving community service should be key facets of the courts. A system of accountability similar to the one in Rwanda, in which 90 percent of the electorate voted for Gacaca judges, would ensure that local judges have the consent of the people and are not arbitrarily appointed.37 Moreover, the international community should establish sentencing guidelines, which would standardize punishments and guarantee a focus on reintegration, not retribution. By utilizing a localized judicial system, the international community can transition from a goal of short-term peace to long-term stability.
In the wake of the atrocities in Somalia and Rwanda, it is critical that the international community learn to better protect against crimes against humanity. By addressing the root causes of conflict, rapidly deploying a long-term peacekeeping force, and shifting to a localized administration approach, international actors can convert rhetoric into results. The process will not happen overnight, but by implementing these policies, the international community can begin to make “never again” a reality.
Notes
1. Goodrich, Leland Matthew, and Edvard Isak Hambro. Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. London: World Peace Foundation, 1949.
2. Sahnoun, Mohamed. Somalia: The Missed Opportunities. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994.
3. Brown, Michael E., and Richard N. Rosecrance. The Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.
4. Sahnoun. Somalia.
5. Bush, George. “Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia.” Lettter from President Bush to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Washington, DC, December 10, 1992.
6. "Human Rights Watch World Report 1993—Somalia." Human Rights Watch. January 1, 1993. Accessed January 20, 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca601e.html
7. Rishmawi, Mona. "Situation of Human Rights in Somalia." UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva. April 22, 1999.
8. "Somalia—UNOSOM I." United Nations Operations in Somalia I . March 21, 1997. Accessed 23 January 2009. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm
9. Sahnoun. Somalia.10. Ibid.
11. Smith, Michael. Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team. New York: St. Martin's, 2007.
12. Kaempf, Sebastian. “Somalia and General Aideed's Strategic Response to U.S. Intervention: Invoking America's Experiences in Lebanon and Vietnam.” Paper presented at the nnual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 2007.
13. Copson, Raymond W. Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.
14. Peterson, Scott. Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda. New York: Routledge, 2000.
15. Cohen, Jared. One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
16. Ibid.
17. Sutton, Barbara, Sandra Morgen, and Julie Novkov. Security Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race, and Militarization. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008.
18. Khan, Shaharyar M., and Mary Robinson. The Shallow Graves of Rwanda. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000.
19. Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.
20. "Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide." Special Report, January 1995. United States Institute of Peace. Accessed January 20, 2009.
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwanda1.html
21. "Timeline: 100 Days of Genocide." BBC News, April 6, 2004. AccessedJanuary 21, 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3580247.stm
22. Kern, Vince. Discussion paper. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 18, 1998.
23. Cohen, Jared. One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,2007.
24. Ibid.
25. Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
26. Ibid.
27. Drumbl, Mark A. Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
28. Ibid.
29. Rettig, Max. "Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?" African Studies Review 51 (2008): 25¬–50.
30. Wilson, Tamsin. "Microfinance during and after Armed Conflict: Lessons from Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Rwanda.” Concern Worldwide and the Springfield Centre for Business in Development. March 2002. AccessedJanuary 22 2009. http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/14563_14563.pdf
31. Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2000.
32. As suggested in Allan Thompson and Kofi Annan. The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007.
33. Albright, Madeleine K., and William S. Cohen, co-chairs. Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. Genocide Prevention Task Force. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, American Academy of Diplomacy, and United States Institute of Peace. 2008. Accessed January 21, 2009. http://www.usip.org/genocide_taskforce/pdf/FINAL%20REPORT.pdf
34. As suggested in Lakhdar Brahimi, chairman. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. New York: United Nations, 2000.
35. Sahnoun. Somalia.
36. Ibid.
37. Brown, Jane. "Rwanda—Gacaca." Center for Communication Programs, John Hopkins University. 2005. Accessed January 19, 2009.
http://www.jhuccp.org/africa/rwanda/gacaca.shtml
Bibliography
Print Sources
Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000.
Barnett, Michael. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
Brahimi, Lakhdar, chairman. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. New York: United Nations, 2000.
Brown, Michael E., and Richard N. Rosecrance. The Cost of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield , 1999.
Bush, George. “Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia.” Lettter from President Bush to the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Washington, DC, December 10, 1992.
Cohen, Jared. One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.
Copson, Raymond W. Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.
Drumbl, Mark A. Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Goodrich, Leland Matthew, and Edvard Isak Hambro. Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. London: World Peace Foundation, 1949.
Kaempf, Sebastian. “Somalia and General Aideed's Strategic Response to U.S. Intervention: Invoking Americas Experiences in Lebanon and Vietnam.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. Chicago, IL, 2007.
Kern, Vince. Discussion paper. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 18, 1998.
Khan, Shaharyar M., and Mary Robinson. The Shallow Graves of Rwanda. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000.
Peterson, Scott. Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Rettig, Max. "Gacaca: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation in Postconflict Rwanda?" African Studies Review 51 (2008): 25–50.
Rishmawi, Mona. "Situation of Human Rights in Somalia." UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva. April 22, 1999.
Sahnoun, Mohamed. Somalia: The Missed Opportunities. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994.
Smith, Michael. Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team. New York: St. Martin's, 2007.
Sutton, Barbara, Sandra Morgen, and Julie Novkov. Security Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race, and Militarization.
Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008.
Thompson, Allan, and Kofi Annan. The Media and the Rwanda Genocide. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007.
Internet Sources
Albright, Madeleine K., and William S. Cohen, co-chairs. Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. Genocide Prevention Task Force. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, American Academy of Diplomacy, and United States Institute of Peace. 2008. Accessed January 21, 2009. http://www.usip.org/genocide_taskforce/pdf/FINAL%20REPORT.pdf
Brown, Jane. "Rwanda—Gacaca." Center for Communication Programs, John Hopkins University. 2005. Accessed January 19, 2009. http://www.jhuccp.org/africa/rwanda/gacaca.shtml
"Human Rights Watch World Report 1993—Somalia." January 1, 1993. Human Rights Watch. Accessed January 20, 2009. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca601e.html
"Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide." Special Report, January 1995. United States Institute of Peace. Accessed January 20, 2009. http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/rwanda1.html
"Somalia—UNOSOM I." United Nations Operations in Somalia I. March 21, 1997. Accessed January 23, 2009. http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm
"Timeline: 100 Days of Genocide," BBC News, April 6, 2004. Accessed January 21, 2009.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3580247.stm
Wilson, Tamsin. "Microfinance during and after Armed Conflict: Lessons from Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda.” Concern Worldwide and the Springfield Centre for Business in Development. March 2002. Accessed January 22, 2009. http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/14563_14563.pdf
20100426
Being an American 2
Hannah Deindorfer, Great Lakes Region
Saranac High School, Saranac, MI; Teacher: Cynthia Sanford
No one expected that creating a country would be easy. From the Mayflower Compact, to the Declaration of Independence, to the Bill of Rights, America's Founders had to fight against every imaginable odd to create the country that I know and love today. Without the civic virtue of perseverance, America would be nothing more than a British colony. Perseverance is defined as a steady persistence in a course of action, in spite of difficulties, obstacles, and discouragement. Americans have truly faced all of the above, but it is equally true that members of this nation have displayed, without falter, the perseverance necessary to overcome any
difficulty, all obstacles, and every discouragement imaginable. In December of 1776, Americans were in the midst of the Revolutionary War, and facing the largest obstacle
to the freedom and existence of this country that has ever existed. At first, patriot soldiers were buoyed with confidence, especially after the Battle of Bunker Hill, and the quick response of minutemen at Lexington and Concord. But when December came, it was a different story. Washington's troops were on the run, lacking
basic supplies, and the outlook for victory was bleak. In this dark time, no document embodied what it means to be an American more than Thomas Paine's The American Crisis. This pamphlet, written on a drum, declared to all that, "These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will...shrink from the service of the country, but he that stands now, deserves the loved and thanks of man and woman." General George Washington was so moved by Paine's patriotic rhetoric that he read The American Crisis to his troops just before their enlistments were up, and many were encouraged to persevere and eventually win the war for independence. The spirit of Thomas Paine's famous series of articles lived on through the end of the victorious Revolution to the 1800s. An African American woman named Harriet Tubman was faced with adversity from birth. Harriet was born a slave in 1820, and by the age of thirteen, she was used as a field hand by her cruel master. In 1849,Harriet resolved to run away. She left the plantation where she was raised and abused, and followed the North Star all the way to Philadelphia. What truly makes Harriet an American hero was that she persevered into slave country nineteen times. Harriet escorted over three hundred slaves to freedom, and as the most wellknown conductor of the Underground Railroad, she "never lost a passenger." By 1856, the price for the capture of Harriet Tubman was $40,000. On any of her dangerous journeys, she could have been easily caught or killed, but to Tubman, persevering to secure the freedom of others was worth more than her own life. Though I haven't found myself leading slaves to freedom, I have persevered through adversity in my own life. When I was thirteen years old, my father was diagnosed with a serious illness. This disease threatened to tear my family apart. For the next year, I faced the most difficult time of my life. As the oldest child, I had to set an example of courage for my younger siblings. Though I wanted to break down, I had to stay steady for them. In the midst of this personal crisis, I found my own strength and sense of perseverance. Today, my dad has his disorder under control and my family is closer than ever. I thank God every day for giving me the will to persevere. Thomas Paine said, "What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly; it is darkness only that gives everything its value." The history of the United States has been built on fighting for what we hold dear. In the face of
darkness, persevering to reach our goals is the only thing that matters. To me, being an American means always striving for something better and never giving up. "Tis the business of little minds to shrink, but he whose heart is firm...will pursue his principles unto death." Thomas Paine believed, like me, that nothing is
more important than aspiring to bring one's own ideals to realization. In a moment of adversity, it is easy to give up, but a true American has the strength to persevere.
Saranac High School, Saranac, MI; Teacher: Cynthia Sanford
No one expected that creating a country would be easy. From the Mayflower Compact, to the Declaration of Independence, to the Bill of Rights, America's Founders had to fight against every imaginable odd to create the country that I know and love today. Without the civic virtue of perseverance, America would be nothing more than a British colony. Perseverance is defined as a steady persistence in a course of action, in spite of difficulties, obstacles, and discouragement. Americans have truly faced all of the above, but it is equally true that members of this nation have displayed, without falter, the perseverance necessary to overcome any
difficulty, all obstacles, and every discouragement imaginable. In December of 1776, Americans were in the midst of the Revolutionary War, and facing the largest obstacle
to the freedom and existence of this country that has ever existed. At first, patriot soldiers were buoyed with confidence, especially after the Battle of Bunker Hill, and the quick response of minutemen at Lexington and Concord. But when December came, it was a different story. Washington's troops were on the run, lacking
basic supplies, and the outlook for victory was bleak. In this dark time, no document embodied what it means to be an American more than Thomas Paine's The American Crisis. This pamphlet, written on a drum, declared to all that, "These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will...shrink from the service of the country, but he that stands now, deserves the loved and thanks of man and woman." General George Washington was so moved by Paine's patriotic rhetoric that he read The American Crisis to his troops just before their enlistments were up, and many were encouraged to persevere and eventually win the war for independence. The spirit of Thomas Paine's famous series of articles lived on through the end of the victorious Revolution to the 1800s. An African American woman named Harriet Tubman was faced with adversity from birth. Harriet was born a slave in 1820, and by the age of thirteen, she was used as a field hand by her cruel master. In 1849,Harriet resolved to run away. She left the plantation where she was raised and abused, and followed the North Star all the way to Philadelphia. What truly makes Harriet an American hero was that she persevered into slave country nineteen times. Harriet escorted over three hundred slaves to freedom, and as the most wellknown conductor of the Underground Railroad, she "never lost a passenger." By 1856, the price for the capture of Harriet Tubman was $40,000. On any of her dangerous journeys, she could have been easily caught or killed, but to Tubman, persevering to secure the freedom of others was worth more than her own life. Though I haven't found myself leading slaves to freedom, I have persevered through adversity in my own life. When I was thirteen years old, my father was diagnosed with a serious illness. This disease threatened to tear my family apart. For the next year, I faced the most difficult time of my life. As the oldest child, I had to set an example of courage for my younger siblings. Though I wanted to break down, I had to stay steady for them. In the midst of this personal crisis, I found my own strength and sense of perseverance. Today, my dad has his disorder under control and my family is closer than ever. I thank God every day for giving me the will to persevere. Thomas Paine said, "What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly; it is darkness only that gives everything its value." The history of the United States has been built on fighting for what we hold dear. In the face of
darkness, persevering to reach our goals is the only thing that matters. To me, being an American means always striving for something better and never giving up. "Tis the business of little minds to shrink, but he whose heart is firm...will pursue his principles unto death." Thomas Paine believed, like me, that nothing is
more important than aspiring to bring one's own ideals to realization. In a moment of adversity, it is easy to give up, but a true American has the strength to persevere.
20100425
Being an American
Lindsey Bergholz, Great Lakes Region
Hindsdale Central High School, Burr Ridge, IL; Teacher: Christian Korfist
When Thomas Paine published Common Sense in 1776, he seized the initiative to challenge British authority and rally Americans to pursue independence from Great Britain. Our 11th President, James Polk, demonstrated this essential American civic value when he enlarged this country by 800,000 square miles. When I set a goal for myself, to be a radio program manager for our high school, I followed those models and took actions to achieve my goals. Throughout American history, our leaders have demonstrated a core civic value: initiative. By displaying zealous ambition, our Founding Fathers bettered themselves and our country;nowhere in the world is this value as strongly evidenced as in America.On January 10th of 1776, Thomas Paine published a pamphlet to encourage Americans to take action against Britain to secure our independence. Thomas Paine's writing was one of the catalysts moving the country to action. In the first three months of its publication, 120,000 copies were sold. Common Sense was recognized as important in its time, but also by others such as Andrew Jackson years later who stated, "Thomas Paine needs no monument made by hands; he has erected a monument in the hearts of all lovers of liberty." Paine wrote
that "time makes more converts than reason," understanding that many people need a lot of time to change their minds; but his urging relied on reason, common sense, and emotion to get people to take the initiative with him. He realized our battle for independence would have to start with individuals taking the initiative to
successfully accomplish the revolution. Less than six months after the publication of this effective document,Common Sense stood by our side as the gunshots began.
President James Polk offers another model of the American civic value, initiative. The "dark horse" of the 1844 election, President Polk overcame many adversities. His beginnings were filled with sickness and poverty. He was raised by an illiterate father, yet persuaded his dad to send him to school. Polk took steps to gain an education, believing in his own potential. Polk then went on to win the 1844 election. "Young Hickory" was elected on his campaign promise to further the nation's expansion. Relying on his political acumen, Polk took the initiative by keeping sustained pressure on Britain to make a treaty and cede the Oregon Territory to the United States. We came close to war, but President Polk utilized his strategic abilities perfectly. He set troops on the corners of the territory boundaries, making it clear to Britain that Polk would fight before letting Britain gain land. Each additional square mile Polk gained was due to his initiative; by
taking the steps necessary to ensure his success, our 11th President is remembered as a man of action and brilliance.I model my own behavior on people like Polk and Paine. My high school broadcasts many radio programs on a local station. Being a manager is a coveted spot. Managers are entrusted with responsibilities; it takes
dedication and initiative to be chosen. My goal freshman year was to achieve this unique position. Each year I signed up for radio and participated, practicing my impromptu with a coach. Each year I studied the field.Each year I built relationships with the people around me. I came in before and after school, working to better myself, improving my chances, gaining knowledge to help me in the future. I initiated a journey that taught me about myself. The journey rewarded me with the manager position, which I fulfill today with great pride and personal satisfaction. I did not wait around for things to happen: I took the initiative for which Americans are famous. Thomas Paine wrote: "I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense." Paine's initiative to write, to publish, and to speak aloud moved a population to action. When President Polk won the 1844 election he seized the initiative to follow through on his campaign promise to enlarge the country. He acted on this great civic value that inspires us to make things better – for our country and for ourselves. I imagined myself as a radio manager and then seized the day; I achieved my goal through the powerful civic value of initiative. Throughout American history, most major turning points that have led to positive changes have begun with one person taking the initiative, and so it will continue to be.
Hindsdale Central High School, Burr Ridge, IL; Teacher: Christian Korfist
When Thomas Paine published Common Sense in 1776, he seized the initiative to challenge British authority and rally Americans to pursue independence from Great Britain. Our 11th President, James Polk, demonstrated this essential American civic value when he enlarged this country by 800,000 square miles. When I set a goal for myself, to be a radio program manager for our high school, I followed those models and took actions to achieve my goals. Throughout American history, our leaders have demonstrated a core civic value: initiative. By displaying zealous ambition, our Founding Fathers bettered themselves and our country;nowhere in the world is this value as strongly evidenced as in America.On January 10th of 1776, Thomas Paine published a pamphlet to encourage Americans to take action against Britain to secure our independence. Thomas Paine's writing was one of the catalysts moving the country to action. In the first three months of its publication, 120,000 copies were sold. Common Sense was recognized as important in its time, but also by others such as Andrew Jackson years later who stated, "Thomas Paine needs no monument made by hands; he has erected a monument in the hearts of all lovers of liberty." Paine wrote
that "time makes more converts than reason," understanding that many people need a lot of time to change their minds; but his urging relied on reason, common sense, and emotion to get people to take the initiative with him. He realized our battle for independence would have to start with individuals taking the initiative to
successfully accomplish the revolution. Less than six months after the publication of this effective document,Common Sense stood by our side as the gunshots began.
President James Polk offers another model of the American civic value, initiative. The "dark horse" of the 1844 election, President Polk overcame many adversities. His beginnings were filled with sickness and poverty. He was raised by an illiterate father, yet persuaded his dad to send him to school. Polk took steps to gain an education, believing in his own potential. Polk then went on to win the 1844 election. "Young Hickory" was elected on his campaign promise to further the nation's expansion. Relying on his political acumen, Polk took the initiative by keeping sustained pressure on Britain to make a treaty and cede the Oregon Territory to the United States. We came close to war, but President Polk utilized his strategic abilities perfectly. He set troops on the corners of the territory boundaries, making it clear to Britain that Polk would fight before letting Britain gain land. Each additional square mile Polk gained was due to his initiative; by
taking the steps necessary to ensure his success, our 11th President is remembered as a man of action and brilliance.I model my own behavior on people like Polk and Paine. My high school broadcasts many radio programs on a local station. Being a manager is a coveted spot. Managers are entrusted with responsibilities; it takes
dedication and initiative to be chosen. My goal freshman year was to achieve this unique position. Each year I signed up for radio and participated, practicing my impromptu with a coach. Each year I studied the field.Each year I built relationships with the people around me. I came in before and after school, working to better myself, improving my chances, gaining knowledge to help me in the future. I initiated a journey that taught me about myself. The journey rewarded me with the manager position, which I fulfill today with great pride and personal satisfaction. I did not wait around for things to happen: I took the initiative for which Americans are famous. Thomas Paine wrote: "I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense." Paine's initiative to write, to publish, and to speak aloud moved a population to action. When President Polk won the 1844 election he seized the initiative to follow through on his campaign promise to enlarge the country. He acted on this great civic value that inspires us to make things better – for our country and for ourselves. I imagined myself as a radio manager and then seized the day; I achieved my goal through the powerful civic value of initiative. Throughout American history, most major turning points that have led to positive changes have begun with one person taking the initiative, and so it will continue to be.
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